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Abstract 
 
 
This article examines the way that critical discourse is written. It does so by considering 
the concept of nominalization. Critical discourse analysts have suggested that 
nominalization (along with passivization) has important ideological functions such as 
deleting agency and reifying processes. However, the language used by critical analysts, 
as they explore nominalization, is revealing. They tend to use, and thereby instantiate, the 
very forms of language whose ideological potentiality they are warning against - such as 
deleting agency, using passives and turning processes into entities. The concept of 
‘nominalization’ is itself a nominalization; it is typically used in imprecise ways that fail 
to specify underlying processes. If critical analysts take seriously their own ideological 
warnings about nominalization and passivization, they need to change the standard ways 
of writing critical analysis. We need to use simpler, less technical prose that clearly 
ascribes actions to human agents. 
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All discourse analysts face a paradoxical situation. We investigate language, yet at the 
same time we must use language in order to make our investigations. We have no 
separate tools to pursue our tasks. Discourse analysis does not, and cannot, exist outside 
of language: it comprises articles, books, talks etc. We cannot, therefore, rigidly separate 
the objects of our analyses from the means by which we conduct our analyses. The 
problem is particularly acute for critical discourse analysts. We seek to analyse language 
critically, exposing the workings of power and ideology within the use of language. But 
how can we do this, if we have to use language in order to make our critical analyses? 
How can we be sure that our own use of language is not marked, even corrupted, by those 
ideological factors that we seek to identify in the language of others? 
 
This is an inescapable problem which critical discourse analysts should bear in mind 
particularly as Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is becoming established as a 
successful, academic sub-speciality. With success there inevitably comes criticism. Of 
course, CDA’s traditional critics continue with their attacks (e.g., Widdowson, 2004), 
but, as Beaugrande (2006) notes, some left-wing critics have recently been questioning 
the value of CDA. In addition, some critical discourse analysts have been engaging is 
self-critique. That is not surprising. If critical discourse analysts are to be fully ‘critical’, 
they should not be shy of critically examining the successful emergence of CDA and 
other critical studies (Billig, 2000, 2003; and, more generally, 2008). Chilton (2005), who 
has contributed much to the development of CDA, questions what CDA has actually 
contributed to our understanding of the practice of language. As Wodak (2006) suggests, 
there is plenty of scope for fruitful, productive debate. 
 
Accordingly, critical discourse analysts should be particularly concerned to examine their 
own use of language. How to write CDA is much more than an issue of style. It should be 
a major issue for analysts who stress the pivotal role of language in the reproduction of 
ideology, inequality and power. In discussing this, it is important to examine how critical 
analysts actually use language, rather than writing in general, theoretical terms. 
Therefore, in this paper I will try to identify and analyse a particular phenomenon: 
namely, critical analysts instantiating in their own writings the same linguistic forms that 
they criticise in the language of others. 
 
This occurs when analysts are critically examining a particular form of 
discourse/syntax/semantics and they themselves use that particular form – not as an 
example, but as part of their analysis. In so doing, they provide an instance of the object 
of analysis within their own analysis of that object. This would not matter greatly if the 
analyst were providing the instance self-reflectively. It does matter if the analyst seems 
unaware that they are using the very linguistic forms that they are critically analysing. If 
critical analysts use the same forms of language, whose ideological biases they are 
exposing in others, then they might be uncritically and unselfconsciously instantiating 
those very biases. 
 
 
Nominalization and Passivization 
In order to prevent the discussion about instantiating objects of analysis from becoming 
too diffuse, I will concentrate on the ways that leading critical discourse analysts have 
discussed ‘nominalization’, and, to a lesser extent, ‘passivization’. Both concepts have 
been enormously important in the development of Critical Discourse Analysis, especially 
in the early work Roger Fowler and the East Anglian School. Teun van Dijk has recently 
identified Language and Social Control (Fowler et al, 1979) as the seminal book which 
really introduced CDA (van Dijk, 2007: xxiv-xxv). In that work, Fowler and his co-
workers built upon the linguistic ideas of Michael Halliday in order to demonstrate how 
the details of texts can serve to reproduce the workings of ideology. Although critical 
discourse analysts today are less reliant on the grammar of Halliday, the early work of 
Fowler and his colleagues has remained a major and continuing influence (Fairclough, 
2005; van Dijk, 2001b; Wodak, 2006, 2007).  
 
The analysis of ‘nominalization’ was one of the most exciting features of the early work. 
By examining a series of examples, Fowler et al (1979) demonstrated that choosing noun 
phrases over verbs and the passive voice over active voice was often ideologically 
charged. Their work, together with the classic work of Fowler (1991), transformed our 
understanding of common discursive phenomena such as newspaper headlines. Most 
readers of Language and Social Control would afterwards find it difficult to view 
headlines such as ‘Attack on Protestors’ as innocent summaries of reported stories. The 
East Anglian Group pointed out that such headlines systematically omitted the agents of 
the action. In this case, the agents would be the people who were attacking the protestors. 
A headline writer could omit this information by using a noun such as ‘attack’, or by 
using a passive verb: ‘Protestors Attacked’. A sentence, which used ‘attack’ as an active 
verb, would need to identify who was doing the attacking: e.g. ‘Police Attack Protestors’. 
Fowler and his colleagues persuasively argued that in these contexts the choice of passive 
over active, or of noun over verb, was not ideologically random. 
 
Fowler and colleagues bracketed together the producing of nouns/noun phrases, or 
nominalization, with the producing of passive constructions or ‘passivization’. They took 
both concepts – nominalization and passivization – from linguistics. Significantly, Fowler 
and colleagues described both as processes or transformations. Nominalization was, for 
instance, ‘turning verbs into nouns’ (Fowler et al: 14). It was a ‘process of syntactic 
reduction’ (p. 41, emphasis added). They wrote: ‘nominalization is a transformation 
which reduces a whole clause to its nucleus, the verb, and turns that into a noun’ (p. 39). 
The significance of describing nominalization and passivization as processes or 
transformations will, it is hoped, become clearer later on.  
 
The East Anglian group and subsequent analysts emphasised that there are several 
ideological features associated with nominalization and passivization: (a) deleting 
agency; (b) reifying; (c) positing reified concepts as agents; (d) maintaining unequal 
power relations. 
 
(a) Deleting agency. As has been mentioned, the East Anglian group argued that if 
speakers/writers used nominalization or passivization, they can transform statements that 
identified agents of actions into agentless statements that convey less information. The 
linguist, Ronald Langacker (1999) has described nominalization as an asymmetric 
process. While a sentence that describes an agent performing an act can be easily 
transformed by nominalization into a statement about the act, the reverse is not true. 
‘Police attack protestors’ can be easily transformed by anyone with a knowledge of the 
syntactic rules of English into ‘An attack on protestors occurred’. However, knowledge 
of the linguistic rules of syntactic transformation does not enable the native speaker to 
construct the former sentence from the latter, because nominalization has ensured that the 
latter sentence contains less information than the former.  
 
(b) Reifying. By turning verbs into nouns, speakers/writers can convey that the entities, 
denoted by nominalization, have a real and necessary existence. Hallidayan grammar 
distinguishes processes and entities. In general terms, by means of nominalization 
speakers/writers turn processes into entities and typically assume the existence of such 
entities. Fowler (1991) writes that by means of nominalization ‘processes and qualities 
assume the status of things: impersonal, inanimate, capable of being amassed and counted 
like capital, paraded like possessions’ (p. 80). These linguistically created things have a 
privileged discursive status because of their presumed existence (see also, Moltmann, 
2007). As Halliday and Martin (1993) have commented, the presuppositions that justify 
the existence of these entities are harder to contest because ‘you can argue with a clause 
but you can’t argue with a nominal group’ (p. 39). Fowler et al (1979) note that official 
discourse often uses nominalizations in this way, thereby conveying that present social 
arrangements are objective, unchangeable things. Muntigl (2002) and Mautner (2005) 
have examined how writers on economics can use nominalization to imply economic 
processes, such as ‘market forces’, are ‘objective things’ rather than the contingent results 
of human actions. 
 
(c) Positing reified concepts as agents. Speakers/writers can then use the abstract, reified 
concepts as agents of processes. Instead of talking about people buying and selling 
commodities for various prices, economists, administrators, journalists etc might talk 
about ‘market-forces’. The nominal term ‘market-forces’ can then be used as the subject 
for verbs that denote agency: ‘market-forces dictate/demand/forbid…’ etc (see also 
Fairclough, 2003: 143ff; Stenvall, 2007). This completes the transformation of processes 
into entities: these nominalized entities then become posited as the agents of processes. 
 
(d) Maintaining unequal power relations. The East Anglian Group claimed that it was no 
accident that the writers of formal documents tended to use nominalization and 
passivization. Fowler et al wrote about the relations between ‘nominalization’ and 
‘lexicalization’: new lexical terms can be created through nominalizing verbs. Technical 
and scientific writers often use nominalization in this way. The effect of creating new 
terms often ‘is control through the one-way flow of knowledge’ (Fowler et al, 1979: 33). 
Halliday and Martin (1993) make a similar point in their analysis of the language of 
science. Scientists use technical language which is filled with nominalizations rendering 
processes as entities. Those, who create and use this specialised language, act as the 
gatekeepers for the scientific community, ensuring that young researchers write in the 
appropriate way. As such, formal discourse belongs to, and helps reproduce, a social 
context of inequality. 
 
Given these four properties, it is no surprise that Fowler et al (1979) warned that 
nominalization and passivization, especially when used by official speakers/writers, lent 
themselves to ideological uses. Fowler (1991), referring to the argument of Language and 
Social Control, commented that ‘we claimed nominalization was inherently potentially 
mystificatory; and that it permitted habits of concealment’ (p. 80). 
 
 
Problems with the Ideological Analysis of Nominalization 
Although the work of the East Anglian group has had a decisive impact on Critical 
Discourse Analysis, some analysts have found problems with their work on 
nominalization. For example, some critics have suggested that in certain contexts it is by 
no means mystificatory to use nominalization (e.g., Malrieu, 1999). Instead of listing all 
possible problems, I will focus on two themes, which are relevant to the issue of 
instantiating the objects of analysis. 
 
The first theme is the assumption that some forms of description are more congruent than 
others. Points (a) and (b) suggest that there are more and less ‘natural’ syntactic forms for 
particular sorts of description. Halliday’s Introduction to Functional Grammar claimed 
that some descriptions were ‘congruent’ as compared with others that were 
‘metaphorical’ (see, for instance, Halliday, 1985: 321ff). Fairclough (2003), who 
criticises the notion of congruency, succinctly summarises what it means in relation to 
describing entities and processes: ‘Entities, things (as well as persons) are congruently 
represented linguistically as nouns, whereas processes are congruently represented 
linguistically as verbs with associated subjects, objects and so forth’ (p. 143). According 
to Halliday and Martin (1993) modern sciences and social sciences often fail to use 
congruent language, because scientific writers use nominalization routinely to treat 
processes as if they were entities (but see Goatly, 2007, for an important, extended 
critique of the notion of congruency). 
 
There is a second line of possible criticism – although critical discourse analysts have 
tended not to develop it in great detail. Fowler et al (1979) and subsequent analysts 
describe nominalization as a process – although, as I will suggest, they do not use the 
concept consistently. However, they do not specify what sort of process nominalization 
is. If verbs are said to be transformed into nouns, then how, when and by whom is this 
transformation accomplished? There are several very different transformations which the 
concept ‘nominalization’ can describe: 
 
Linguistic Nominalization. Linguists have often examined the syntactic rules by 
which competent speakers of a particular language regularly transform verbs into 
nouns and noun phrases (e.g., Maynard, 1999); 
 
Etymological Nominalization. Over time a new noun might be derived from a 
verb and become established as a standard lexical item in the language. Fowler et 
al are describing this process when they offer as examples of nominalization 
‘reporting’ from ‘to report’, and ‘reference’ from ‘to refer’ (see Fowler et al, 
1979: 14). 
 
Psychological Nominalization. This would be a supposed cognitive process, 
which would occur if speakers/writers spontaneously (and congruently) think in 
terms of noun/active-verb sentences, and then transform these thoughts by 
nominalization when they come to express them. 
 
Between-Text Nominalization. This occurs when one text uses noun/active-verb 
descriptions but the writer of a second text repeats these descriptions, but 
transforms them through nominalization (see, for example, the study by Kuo and 
Nakama, 2005). 
 
Within-Text Nominalization. This occurs when a text describes a process in terms 
of noun/active-verb, but then introduces a noun as a name for such a description 
and henceforth uses this noun as a way of referring to the process.  According to 
Halliday and Martin (1993) this is a common feature of scientific writing (see also 
Halliday, 2003: 42ff). 
 
 
Many critical analysts have retained the general concept of nominalization (and that of 
passivization) within their critical armoury, despite not distinguishing between the 
different possible processes for nominalising verbs. Like the East Anglian group, such 
analysts convey an ideological distrust of nominalization. Recent analysts continue to 
quote approvingly Fowler’s comment about nominalization being potentially 
mystificatory (e.g., Kuo and Nakamar, 2005: 404; Stenvall, 2007: 210). Likewise 
Schroder (2002: 105) claims that ‘syntactic transformations, particularly those labelled 
‘passivization’ and ‘nominalization’, can be considered ideologically problematic’. 
 
 
Describing and Instantiating Nominalization 
Readers with a background in CDA will probably have read the quotation from Schroder 
as a familiar description that scarcely merits examination. But look at it carefully. It 
warns against ‘passivization’, calling it problematic. The sentence contains two verbs. 
Both are in the passive tense: ‘labelled’ and ‘can be considered’. In using them, the writer 
omits agency – leaving unspecified who does the labelling or who might consider 
passivization as problematic. By the omission, the writer conveys that everyone might do 
so. The sentence also warns against ‘nominalization’. It uses three words that, at least 
etymologically, are the products of nominalization: namely, ‘transformation’, 
‘passivization’ and ‘nominalization’. Again agency is omitted. We are not told whose 
syntactic transformations are problematic; nor are we told how the activity of 
transforming was accomplished. In short, this familiar type of description seems to 
instantiate the very linguistic features that it warns against.  
 
Of course, one quotation proves little. It is necessary to show a pattern. To this end, I will 
look at some of the classic writings on nominalization by Roger Fowler and his 
colleagues. I will also examine how one of the most respected figures in CDA, Norman 
Fairclough, discusses ‘nominalization’. My aim is not to subvert their important work; 
quite the reverse, by taking their ideas of nominalization seriously, I intend to examine 
how these authors can instantiate the very syntactic forms that they are analytically 
putting under suspicion. 
 
First, I will give a couple of examples to show that the Schroder quotation is not 
exceptional. Fowler et al (1979) write that ‘in most styles that people find ‘formal’ and 
‘impersonal’ two syntactic constructions are almost invariably found to be prevalent: 
nominalization and passivization’ (p. 39). The verb ‘find’ is used twice, once in the active 
tense. The second use is passive – ‘are almost invariably found’. The sentence, like 
Schroder’s uses three nouns that prima facie may have etymologically emerged through 
by nominalization: construction, nominalization and passivization. 
 
Fairclough (1992: 27), in introducing the concepts of nominalization, writes that 
‘nominalization is the conversion of a clause into a nominal or noun’. He goes on to say 
that nominalization, along with ‘passivization’, ‘may be associated with ideologically 
significant features of texts such as the systematic mystification of agency; both allow the 
agent of a clause to be deleted’. He uses the passive tense: passivization ‘may be 
associated’. In using the passive tense, he does not specify the agents who might 
associate nominalization and passivization with ideologically significant features of the 
text. When he says that these features ‘allow the agent of a clause to be deleted’, again he 
uses a passive – ‘to be deleted’ – which in its turn  permits him to delete who might be 
the agent who is deleting agents.  He presents nominalization as a ‘conversion’. By using 
the noun ‘conversion’, rather than the active tense of the verb ‘convert’, he need not 
specify who does the converting or how and when they do it. Fairclough, Fowler and 
Schroder do not comment that they are using the sort of terms that they are analysing. 
The indications are that they are instantiating their objects of analysis unselfconsciously. 
 
To give a further example from Fowler et al (1979). They suggest that nominalization can 
involve the creation of new specialized words or ‘relexicalization’. They write: 
 
Many derived nominals can be spotted by their ending in –ion, -ition, -ation, -
ience, -ness, -ment, etc…We have already seen that nominalization facilitates 
relexicalization, the coding of a new, specialised, set of concepts in a new set of 
lexical terms. (p. 40). 
 
Fowler et al then do not note that the terms they are using to make their analysis – 
‘relexicalization’, ‘passivization’, ‘nominalization’ – are precisely the sort of terms that 
they are discussing: derived nominals ending in ‘-ation’. Their own theoretical terms, to 
use their own phrase, comprise a specialised set of concepts in a new set of lexical terms. 
Yet, this is just the sort of language that the authors suggest might be ideologically 
problematic. 
 
 
Nominalization as Process: Fowler 
If Fowler and his colleagues are correct, then nominalization and passivization can 
function to conceal and this would include their own use of nominalizations. Examples, 
however, need to be examined in detail. Here is a section from Fowler’s Language in the 
News, in which he discusses nominalization: 
 
Nominalization is a radical syntactic transformation of a clause, which has 
extensive structural consequences, and offers substantial ideological 
opportunities. To understand this, reflect on how much information goes 
unexpressed in a derived nominal, compared with a full clause: compare, for 
example, ‘allegations’ with the fully spelt-out proposition ‘X has alleged that Y 
did A and that Y did B (etc.)’. Deleted in the nominal form are the participants 
(who did what to whom?), and indication of time – because there is no verb to be 
tensed – and any indication of modality – the writer’s views as the truth or the 
desirability of the proposition (see pp. 85-7). In Language and Control, we 
claimed that nominalization was, inherently potentially mystificatory; that it 
permitted habits of concealment, particularly in the areas of power-relations and 
writers’ attitudes…If mystification is one potential with nominalization, another is 
reification. Processes and qualities assume the status of things: impersonal, 
inanimate, capable of being amassed and counted like capital, paraded like 
possessions (Fowler, 1991: 80). 
 
The passage describes a number of aspects of nominalization, and, in describing them, it 
instantiates them. First, Fowler describes nominalization as a process - ‘a radical 
syntactic transformation of a clause’. This characterization is self-referential. A process – 
namely transforming a clause from verb forms into a nominal – is itself described by a 
nominal (‘nominalization’), not a verb form. Fowler is treating nominalization as if it 
were an entity, rather than an activity. He is not referring to individual speakers/writers 
engaging in the activity of nominalizing. The verb ‘nominalize’ does not appear in the 
quoted passage. 
 
Fowler (1991) writes that nominalization offers opportunities for deleting information, 
such as information about the participants, time and modality. When speakers/writers use 
active verb clauses, they typically include such information. In describing this, Fowler 
uses also phrases that delete the sort of information that would have been included had he 
used active verbs.  Fowler gives the example of a text referring to ‘allegations’, rather 
than stating X alleged that Y did A.  He claims that ‘deleted in the nominal form’ is 
information about the participants etc. The phrase ‘deleted in the nominal form’ is itself a 
passive. It too deletes: in this case, it contains no information about how the writer in 
question went about the activity (or process) of deleting information nor when the 
activity took place.  
 
This goes to the heart of the matter. Critical discourse analysts typically describe 
nominalization as a process, but they tend to be vague about how the process occurs. Do 
individual speakers/writers engage in nominalization as a psychological process when 
they use nominal forms? Fowler et al (1979) discuss the example of a writer of 
regulations who uses the nominal phrase ‘take responsibility’, rather than the verb ‘be 
responsible for’. They write: ‘The effect of this nominalization is to present a complex 
relation as a simple lexical item, and to introduce the process verb ‘take’’ (p. 30). Fowler 
et al add the comment: ‘We are not suggesting that the writer of these rules went through 
this sequence of syntactic changes; ‘responsibility’ is after all a word which is listed in 
any dictionary of English’ (p. 30).  
 
The comment is revealing. Fowler et al are denying that the nominalization within the 
text indicates that the producer of the text actually engaged in the activity of 
nominalization, thinking first in the active tense and then syntactically transforming the 
active into a nominal form. They are stating that ‘nominalization’ does not necessarily 
refer to a mental process, but they do not indicate what sort of process it might be. 
Instead, there is a gap. They are claiming that verbs have somehow been transformed into 
nouns with a loss of information along the way. They describe this process with a noun – 
‘nominalization’. In so doing, they reproduce the process, which they are describing, by 
avoiding specifying exactly what this process is; how and when it occurs; and most 
importantly who does it. 
 
In practice, Fowler et al, along with other critical discourse analysts, often use 
‘nominalization’ (and ‘passivization’) not to describe the process that produces the 
syntactic forms in a given text, but as a description of the textual entities themselves. 
When Fowler et al write that in most formal styles, ‘two syntactic constructions are 
almost invariably found to be prevalent: nominalization and passivization’ (p. 39, 
emphasis in original), they are not using ‘nominalization’ to describe the process of 
turning of verbs into nouns; they are using ‘nominalization’ (and ‘passivization’) to 
describe particular syntactic forms. In this sense, nominalizations include nouns that have 
been historically derived from verbs, as in the case of ‘allegation’ from ‘to allege’, or 
‘reference’ from ‘to refer’. However, the analysts are not examining the historical, or 
etymological, processes of derivation, or any of the other possible sorts of transformation. 
Instead, the analyst is examining the semantic effects of these linguistic forms that are 
taken as completed entities.  
 
The consequence is that analysts, despite defining ‘nominalization’ as a process, 
frequently treat it methodologically as a syntactic or grammatical entity, which can be 
identified alongside linguistic entities, such as nouns, verbs, gerunds, actives etc. For 
example, van Dijk (2001a) discusses the meaning of various syntactical forms. He 
includes nominalization in a list of such forms: ‘ordering, primacy, pronominal relations, 
active-passive voice, nominalizations, and a host of other formal properties of sentences 
and sequences’ (p. 107).  Typically discourse analysts, including critical analysts, 
examine the discursive and linguistic features of given texts, rather than examining the 
processes of producing and consuming texts (see, for instances, the criticisms of Chilton, 
2005). In so doing, they treat nominalization as a fixed textual feature. When Biber 
(1992) examined the number of nominalizations in particular corpuses, he was not 
studying processes of transformation, but the grammatical properties of those texts (see 
also Bratlinger, 1997; Clark, 2003; Muntigl and Horvath, 2005, van Leeuwen and 
Wodak, 1999; Yeung, 2007 for more research that treats ‘nominalization’ as a 
textual/grammatical entity). In this syntactic sense, the word ‘nominalization’ is most 
certainly a nominalization. 
 
In the passage quoted earlier, Fowler (1991) writes that nominalization facilitates 
‘reification’ because processes assume the status of things. Here Fowler is using a 
nominalization (at least in the sense of a syntactic entity) because he uses the noun form 
(‘reificiation’) rather than saying that speakers/writers are reifying when they nominalize. 
When Fowler and other analysts write in this way, then, according to the force of their 
own arguments, they are engaged in the activity of reifying. This happens also when they 
use ‘nominalization’, which ostensibly describes a process, as the name of a linguistic 
entity. By using the word ‘nominalization’ as a nominalization, denoting an entity whose 
existence is taken for granted, they avoid specifying what sort of process 
‘nominalization’ also seems to name.   
 
 
Nominalization as Process: Fairclough 
At this point, someone might object: ‘You have concentrated on the classic work of 
Fowler et al, but there is little reason for supposing that current work in CDA contains the 
same features.’ In order to deal with such criticism, I will briefly consider how Norman 
Fairclough treats the concept of nominalization. I will suggest that Fairclough, when he 
discusses nominalization, like Fowler instantiates the forms he writes about.  
 
As has been mentioned Fairclough (1992) describes nominalization as a process of 
‘conversion’, which permits the deletion of agency. When he describes nominalization, 
he too deletes agency and uses passive forms. For example, Fairclough (2003) refers to 
nominalization as involving ‘the exclusion of Participants in clauses’ (p. 144). He uses a 
nominal ‘exclusion’, rather than writing of a writer/speaker ‘excluding participants’ from 
clauses. If nominalization is a process, then it is a process that tends linguistically to 
conceal processes. Thus, Fairclough describes nominalization as ‘the conversion of 
processes into nominals, which has the effect of backgrounding the process itself – its 
tense and modality are not indicated – and usually not specifying its participants, so that 
who is doing what to whom is left implicit’ (1992, p. 179).  
 
By using nominal terms such as ‘conversion’, ‘transformation’ and ‘deletion’ in this 
context, Fairclough avoids using phrases that draw attention to the activities that 
language users must accomplish when they nominalize. He does not say that ‘when 
writers/speakers nominalize, they convert clauses into nouns.’ If Fairclough had written 
that, then a reader might ask how exactly do speakers/writers engage in the activity of 
converting? What is that they must do? And when must they do it? Instead, it is said that 
there is a ‘conversion of processes into nominals’ which, as Fairclough suggests, has the 
effect of backgrounding the process. The conversion is presented as an existing entity: it 
has what Wodak (2007) describes as an ‘existential presupposition’. Therefore, when 
Fairclough talks about backgrounding processes, he uses a form of language that itself 
backgrounds the process by which he has defined the nominal ‘nominalization’ in terms 
of another nominal, namely ‘conversion’. As such, he backgrounds the very process of 
nominalising, which ostensibly his statement is foregrounding.  
 
According to Fairclough, ‘nominalization turns processes and activities into states and 
objects, and concretes into abstracts’ (1992, p. 181). The statement could be read as a 
description of the way that critical analysts have used ‘nominalization’ as a concept. They 
have linguistically turned the process of nominalizing into an object – ‘nominalization’. 
They are vague about the ways speakers/writers accomplish this transformation. They do 
not typically distinguish between the different forms of transformation that were 
presented earlier. Analysts then treat nominalization as a syntactic entity that exists in the 
words of a text, rather than as a process that produces, and thereby stands behind, the 
syntax of the text.   
 
In this spirit, Fairclough (2003) identifies the word ‘destruction’ as a nominalization, 
comparing it with ‘is destroyed’ or ‘was destroyed’ (p. 143). The full sentence in which 
Fairclough (2003) describes the ‘exclusion of Participants’ is revealing:  
 
‘It (nominalization) also may involve the exclusion of Participants in clauses – so 
in this case none of the process nouns or nominalizations has an agent (what 
would most commonly be the grammatical subject in a clause)’ (pp.143-4). 
 
‘Nominalization’ here refers to an entity rather than a process. The phrase ‘process nouns 
or nominalizations’ suggests that the two terms are equivalent: a nominalization is a noun 
denoting a process. In other words, the writer is indicating that a nominalization is a 
lexical entity, rather than an unspecified process that results in the use or creation of a 
particular sort of noun. This is what Fowler describes as ‘reification’ or the linguistic 
creation of a thing. In this case, analysts of nominalization are reifying nominalization as 
a thing. 
 
 
The Return of the Agent 
The language of analysts examining nominalization shares a further feature with the 
characteristics that they identify in ideological language. They claim that ideological 
language not only deletes the agents of processes through the use of nominalization, but it 
then ascribes these nominalized processes with agency. Accordingly, nominalized forms 
become the subjects of active sentences, appearing as the agents who do things. This is 
reified language: things and abstract entities, not people, perform actions. According to 
Hallidayan grammar, this is an incongruent use of language. Yet, at the same time, 
critical discourse analysts sometimes depict language (rather than language-users) as 
doing things, as if the language, or particular forms of language, is the agent of action. 
For instance, Fairclough (2003), in his discussion of nominalization, writes that 
nominalization, through generalization and abstraction, ‘can obfuscate agency, and 
therefore responsibility’ (p. 144). Here the writer attributes the action of obfuscating to 
nominalization. Similarly Fairclough (1993) claims: ‘Nominalization turns processes and 
activities into states and objects, and concretes into abstracts’. Nominalization is 
presented as the actor that transforms processes into objects. The agents, having been 
deleted, return but they return as linguistic concepts. 
 
Analysts of language often use active verbs that normally attribute agency to humans. We 
are accustomed to reading about the things that language, discourses and syntactic forms 
can do – as if they were capable of agency. Critical analysts can use this way of writing 
even when warning of the ideological dangers of attributing agency to non-agentic 
entities. Fowler et al (1979), analysing the phrasing of regulations concerning university 
applications, write that ‘the passive structure, allowing agent-deletion, permits a discreet 
silence about who if anyone might refuse to admit the applicant’ (p.41). Fowler (1991) 
writes that nominalization was potentially mystificatory because ‘it permitted habits of 
concealment’ (p. 80). ‘Allowing’ and ‘permitting’ are usually activities ascribed to 
human agents. Here, a grammatical structure is said to permit actions to occur or not 
occur. The form of wording not only ‘permits’ agent-deletion but then it ascribes agency 
for the deleting, not to speakers/writers but to forms of wording. 
 
Jay Lemke (1995) has described this move in his book Textual Politics. He discusses 
critically the abstract language of scientific reports, which linguistically delete human 
agents and then present processes as agents or participant in actions: 
 
Other types of Processes tend to be expressed as Participants, in these relations 
(nominalization). Animate agents, especially the human researchers, tend not to 
appear. This often results from using agentless passive clause structures. The 
nominalized processes on the other hand are frequently reified and used as agents 
in the place of human agents…Nominalization allows an entire activity, a process 
complete with its typical Participants and Circumstances, to be understood merely 
by naming it with the process noun (p 60). 
 
Lemke is instantiating the very linguistic constructions that are the objects of critical 
analysis. He uses passives, as he writes about the role of passives (‘to be expressed’; ‘are 
frequently reified’; ‘to be understood’ etc). His own words do not indicate the agents of 
the processes that he describes. Who is doing the understanding, the nominalizing, the 
using passive structures etc? Nominalizations, it is said, are ‘used as agents in the place 
of human agents’. This sentence is phrased in the passive with ‘nominalizations’ as the 
grammatical subject. The writer’s own choice of phrasing exemplifies the way that 
writers can delete agency. 
 
Lemke, having written that nominalized processes are used as agents in the place of 
human agents, instantiates this unselfconsciously in his very next sentence. He writes that 
‘nominalization allows an entire activity…to be understood’. Here he uses an agentive 
word ‘allows’. Who is allowing an entire activity to be understood? No-one, it appears. 
‘Nominalization’ is grammatically the subject that performs the action of allowing. A 
nominalized process – the very term ‘nominalization’– that is said to allow this to 
happen. The author does not specify how nominalization might be able to allow or permit 
occurrences. Nor does the author give any sign that his readers should understand the use 
of the agentive verb ‘allow’ metaphorically: there is no additional ‘so to speak’, or other 
rhetorical device to convey the use of figurative language. Instead, the author presents his 
words as a straightforward, or literal, description. In this way, Lemke instantiates the very 
grammatical features of reification as he is describing them. 
 
 
Edifice of Nouns 
When critical discourse analysts use nominalizations (in the sense of syntactic entities) 
and passive constructions that do not mention human agents, they are not writing in a 
particularly unique manner. They are following styles of writing that are common in the 
sciences and social sciences. Halliday and Martin (1993) argue that nominalization is 
perennial feature of contemporary scientific writing, as scientists constantly name 
processes through nominalising verbs. Halliday and Martin also point out that the vast 
majority of technical terms in the sciences are nouns. Nouns are the key terms in this 
writing, with the interconnecting verbs semantically downgraded. The resulting prose is 
an ‘edifice of words and phrases’ (p. 39).  
 
We can see these features in critical discourse analysis. Authors use technical nouns to 
describe processes – e.g. nominalization, passivization, perspectivation, genericisation, 
personalization, etc. The verbs that link these technical nouns are often comparatively 
vague: ‘involves’, ‘allows’, ‘permits’. It is as if the verbs are the humble servants who 
lead out their important, nominalized masters in a parade of technical prose. 
 
The question is not whether critical discourse analysts use technical nouns more than 
other social scientists, but whether they should be attempting to use them less. Social 
scientists often justify their use of technical concepts by saying that clearly defined 
specialist words are more precise than those of ordinary language. To judge by the 
example of ‘nominalization’, this justification is not entirely convincing. There is a 
frequent gap between the way analysts define ‘nominalization’ as a process of syntactic 
change and their use the term to denote a syntactic entity. Moreover, the definition is 
imprecise: analysts do not specify what sort of process they are describing. They then use 
this technical term in ways that ensure that they do not need to specify the process. Far 
from using the technical term to explore underlying processes more precisely, they can 
use the term to give an appearance of precision while skirting over what the processes 
are. 
 
For a number of reasons, critical analysts should be concerned about their use of 
technical language. The work of Halliday and others has indicated that technical jargon 
tends to emerge within, and to sustain, social conditions of inequality. High status 
scientists ensure that lower status scientists use technical terms appropriately. Writing 
specifically about nominalization, Lemke (1995: 60) comments: 
 
Discourse types that rely heavily on this strategy divide the world of potential 
readers into initiates and the uninitiated to a much greater degree than do other 
kinds of written expository texts…The world of technical discourse is a closed 
world which admits no criteria of validity outside its own’ 
 
If critical analysts are to take heed of their own analyses, they should worry lest their own 
use of technical jargon, such as ‘nominalization’ and ‘passivization’, belongs to a closed 
world of the initiated.  
 
Critical discourse analysts should also worry that they might be using the same sort of 
reifying language that they criticise other social scientists for using. Using this language, 
writers avoid identifying human agents of actions, transform processes into entities, and 
then treat these process-entities as if they were the agents of actions. Historically, the 
analysis of ideology began with the assertion that social analysts should explain social 
life in terms of the actions of actual people, rather than seeing social actions as 
determined by theoretical concepts. In The German Ideology, the first book that uses 
‘ideology’ in its modern critical sense, Marx and Engels declared that, in contrast with 
the German idealists, they ‘set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real 
life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of 
this life-process’ (1846/1970: 40). The implication is that it is real humans (men and 
women) who do things and who produce the illusions and evasions of ideology. If social 
analysts fail to base their analyses on the study of human actions and life-processes, then 
they will produce ‘ideological echoes’ of social life. 
 
The work of critical discourse analysts has suggested that the language of much 
contemporary social science is poorly equipped for the task of exploring life-processes. It 
is weighted towards nominals, with nouns having priority over verbs, entities over 
processes. Critical discourse analysts have shown how writers, by nominalizing 
descriptions of processes, can describe human life as if it were agentless. Conservative 
analysts might not be bothered about their use of such technical jargon. Critical analysts, 
on the other hand, should be concerned, lest their desire to explore the linguistic 
processes of ideology results in their instantiating those very processes. 
 
There is a political implication. Critical analysis, if it is to be critical, should have 
political targets. These targets should not be abstract entities but the actions of actual 
people or classes of people. It is not language as a system (or discourses or grammar) that 
we should be seeking to change, but the ways that people use language and the 
circumstances in which they do so. The problem is not what language does or does not 
do: it is what people do with language. The demand to start with actual people is as 
pertinent today as it was over a century and a half ago. 
 
 
Implications of Unconscious Instantiation 
In the previous sections, I have presented examples showing how critical analysts can 
instantiate those features of discourse that they are revealing as problematic. I hope to 
have presented sufficient examples to suggest that this is not the stylistic habit of an 
individual author, but that it is more general. Of course, the case would be strengthened 
were there a greater range of examples. Hopefully other analysts will take up these 
points.   
 
For now, one key question remains: do the examples, discussed above, refute or support 
the East Anglian group’s ideas on nominalization? The case that they refute the East 
Anglian group might run as follows. Critical writers have argued that nominalization 
conceals and distorts. Their argument is made through the use of nominalization. Because 
it uses forms that are said to distort, the argument must itself be distorted. Thus, the 
critical argument either destroys itself – or reduces itself to a self-referential paradox. 
Either way, it is seriously compromised. Long-term opponents of critical discourse 
analysis might pounce gleefully upon the preceding analyses. 
 
There is, however, another way of looking at the matter. We can accept the basic analyses 
of Fowler et al about the inherent dangers of nominalization and passivization – about 
how such forms enable writers/speakers to express less information than using active 
forms. Indeed, such analyses represent some of the most exciting and provocative work 
in critical discourse analysis. Having accepted these analyses in general terms, we might 
then draw conclusions about the ways that we should aspire to write. The examples of 
authors instantiating what they warn against do not undermine the basic analyses. Rather, 
they show that writers are not heeding their own warnings, even as they are writing those 
warnings. 
 
One of the most attractive features of Halliday’s approach to language is that he stresses 
that the users of language have to make choices. ‘Discourses’, ‘grammars’, 
‘lexicalizations’, or whatever, do not determine what speakers say or writers write. 
Language users have to select between options. This is one reason why a critical analysis 
of language-use needs to be based on a psychology of language users (see, for instance, 
Billig, 1996; Chilton, 2005; Edwards, 2006; Edwards and Potter, 1993; Potter, 2006). On 
occasions speakers/writers may find it easier not to consider the range of options that are 
available to them, but to go along with familiar, linguistic habits. This might be 
happening with discourse analysts. We have been long accustomed to using standard, 
academic ways of writing, formulating complex passive sentences and linguistic edifices 
of technical nouns. In so doing, we have not appreciated that the message of Fowler et al, 
if taken seriously, should have profound consequences for the ways that we write our 
critical analyses.  
 
If Halliday is correct, then we do not have to nominalise processes and use passives: there 
are always other possible options. With effort, we can try to avoid the standard habits of 
academic writing. This will not be easy. As I know from drafting this article, at each 
point passive impersonal clauses seem readily available; it is so easy to mobilize 
unthinkingly the available technical words, which, like ‘nominalization’, often end in ‘-
ization’. It requires extra effort to turn the passives into actives, or to resist the technical 
vocabulary. When writers do so, they must fill in blanks, supply extra information and 
consider more carefully the social relations that they are describing.  
 
Of course, it would be possible to go through this present article and point out all the 
passives that have been used (including this one) and so on. I could easily be accused of 
perpetrating the faults that I have accused others of committing. However, the tu quoque 
argument is not necessarily fatal (Walton, 1992). Failing to live up to one’s own 
standards is not, in itself, a refutation of those standards, just as one need not jettison all 
moral values because one has not lived a perfectly moral life. George Orwell stressed this 
in his essay ‘Politics and the English Language’. He proposed six rules for writing that 
would help to avoid the lazy habits that were threatening, in his view, independent 
political thinking. The rules included avoiding jargon and passive sentences. Orwell 
admitted that he had probably failed to keep all his own rules, but that made the rules all 
the more, not less, necessary. Orwell commented that his rules might sound elementary; 
yet they ‘demand a deep change of attitude in anyone who has grown used to writing in 
the style now fashionable’ (Orwell, 1946/1962: 156).  
 
Given the influence of Orwell on Roger Fowler, it is appropriate that, in our own small 
way as critical analysts of language, we should aspire to change deeply our styles of 
writing. As the critical perspective becomes academically successful, so we need to 
become self-critically vigilant, lest by default we slip into the very discursive habits that 
we criticise in others. The message of critical analysis is that when speakers/writers start 
defending their own established ways of using language, they are often defending 
established social positions. One might predict, therefore, that as critical discourse 
analysis becomes established in the academic world, so its practitioners will be 
increasingly tempted to write in ways that are socially and intellectually problematic. 
 
In the preceding analysis, I have stressed the dangers of ‘nominalization’. One might, 
then, conclude that the argument expresses the need for ‘De-Nominalization’ and ‘De-
Technologization’, in order to combat ‘Rhetorical Instantiation’. That, however, would 
exemplify just the sort of language to be avoided. We should not seek to create new 
linguistic entities, which, to paraphrase Fowler, we can parade like possessions. Perhaps, 
on the other hand, the argument could be reduced to something snappier and more widely 
understood: ‘Power to the Verb’. It seems to encapsulate the underlying thought. But the 
slogan contains no verbs. Besides, we should be wary of slogans. Critical analysis 
requires clear thinking and clear writing. It will not be easy. Nor should it be. 
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